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COMMENT
The State's Right to Property Under International
Law
INTRODUCTION
On December 3, 2013, agents of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service
seized privileged documents belonging to Timor-Leste on the premises of one
of Timor-Leste's legal advisers in Australia.! The documents concerned an
ongoing arbitration between the two states over Australian espionage. Two
weeks later, Timor-Leste sued Australia before the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) for violating its property rights under international law.' The
claim seemed flawless: there was no dispute that Australia had taken the
documents.' Nevertheless, Australia had a response: the taking was lawful
because states do not have a general right to property under international law.s
As absurd as it may sound, Australia is correct. But two points of
clarification are in order. First, there is no question that individuals have a
1. Memorial of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Questions Relating to the Seizure
and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Austl.), ¶¶ 4.10-.11, 4.14-.15
(Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/156/18698.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q9TY
-3N9T] [hereinafter Memorial of Timor-Leste].
2. Id. ¶ 4.12. On April 23, 2013, Timor-Leste instituted arbitral proceedings against Australia,
claiming that the Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea was invalid
because Australian intelligence services had bugged Timor-Leste's negotiating room during
the treaty negotiations. Id. ¶¶ 3.3--4.
3. Application Instituting Proceedings, Timor-Leste v. Austl., if 1, 3, 1o (Dec. 17, 2013)
[hereinafter Application Instituting Proceedings], http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/fies/156
/17962.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q4DG-GVLR].
4. Counter-Memorial of Australia, Timor-Leste v. Austl., ¶ 1.2 (July 28, 2014), http://www.icj
-cij.org/docket/files/156/18702.pdf [http://perma.cc/A6EV-VCGD].
5. Id. ¶ 5.64; Timor-Leste v. Austl., Verbatim Record, 11-12, 24 (Jan. 21, 2014, 10:00
AM), http://www.icj-cij.org/docketfiles/156/17920.pdf [http://perma.cc/XS5Y-66J6]
[hereinafter Timor-Leste v. Austl., Jan. 21. Verbatim Record].
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general right to property under domestic law.6 Australia was merely asserting
that states do not have such a right under international law.' Second, Australia
was not arguing that taking another state's property is always lawful under
international law; rather, it merely asserted that a taking can be lawful. In
particular, Australia claimed that the state has rights to certain types of property,
but not all types of property. Yet even with these qualifications, the thesis still
sounds absurd. How can states not have a general right to property under
international law?
This Comment explains this unintuitive fact. Surprisingly, very little
scholarly work discusses the state's right to property under international law,"
which formed the basis of Timor-Leste's original claim9 and received
significant attention during oral arguments.o Most of the secondary literature
on Timor-Leste v. Australia has focused on the underlying arbitration rather
than the ICJ litigation,n and commentary on the ICJ case has for the most part
6. This is true under the domestic law of the large majority of states, but there are some
exceptions. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
7. Australia's assertion can be distinguished from John G. Sprankling's thesis on the
international right to property. See generally JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF PROPERTY (2014) (arguing that an international or global right to property has emerged);
John G. Sprankling, The Emergence ofInternational Property Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 461 (2012)
(same); John G. Sprankling, The Global Right to Property, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 464
(2014) [hereinafter Sprankling, The Global Right to Property] (same). Sprankling's notion of
the international right to property is limited to the rights of individuals; it does not extend to
the rights of states, which are the subject of Australia's assertion. See Sprankling, The Global
Right to Property, supra, at 498 ("[T]he right principally concerns the relationship between a
natural or legal person, on the one hand, and a government entity, on the other hand.").
8. John Sprankling's writings on the international right to property focus on the individual's
right to property rather than that of the state. See supra note 7.
g. Application Instituting Proceedings, supra note 3, 5 11.
,o. See Timor-Leste v. Austl., Verbatim Record, 23-25 (Jan. 22, 2014, 5:oo PM), http://www.icj
-cij.org/docket/files/156/17926.pdf [http://perma.cc/6EEU-R2GB]; Timor-Leste v. Austl.,
Verbatim Record, 9-1o, 19 (Jan. 22, 2014, lo:oo AM), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files
/1 56/17922.pdf [http://perma.cc/3YJ7-U4F3] [hereinafter Timor-Leste v. Austl., Jan. 22,
io:oo AM. Verbatim Record]; Timor-Leste v. Austl., Jan. 21. Verbatim Record, supra note 5,
at 11-12, 22-27; Timor-Leste v. Austl., Verbatim Record, 27-28, 36-37 (Jan. 20, 2014, lo:oo
AM), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/156/17918.pdf [http://perma.cc/F3X2-A859].
ii. E.g., Donald K. Anton, The Timor Sea Treaty Arbitration: Timor-Leste Challenges
Australian Espionage and Seizure of Documents, 18 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. INSIGHTS (Feb.
26, 2014), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/6/timor-sea-treaty-arbitration
-timor-leste-challenges-australian-espionage [http://perma.cc/N6SU-9CV4]; Anthony
Bergin, The Growing Timor Gap, STRATEGIST (May 14, 2013), http://www.aspistrategist
.org.au/the-growing-timor-gap [http://perma.cc/UM8Y-H3V6]; Bugs in the Pipeline,
ECONOMIST (June 8, 2013), http://www.economist.con/news/asia/21579o74-timorese
-leaders-push-better-deal-their-offshore-gas-fields-bugs-pipeline [http://perma.cc/TTE8
-RD6F]; Kate Mitchell & Dapo Akande, Espionage & Good Faith in Treaty Negotiations: East
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focused on the privileged nature of the documents rather than the state's right
to property." And unfortunately, the ICJ will not have the opportunity to
address the issue in this particular case, as Timor-Leste withdrew its claim in
June 2015."2
This Comment makes both a descriptive and a normative argument. Part I
argues that as a descriptive matter, states have a general right to territory but
an incomplete right to property under international law. Part II makes the
normative argument that the international community, which has primarily
focused on establishing rights to certain types of property, should now focus
on developing the state's general right to all types of property. Part III offers a
short discussion on how that right could emerge.
I. THE STATE'S RIGHTS TO TERRITORY AND PROPERTY
The state has rights to territory and property. The state's territory is the
physical space over which the state exercises sovereignty.' The state's property
Timor v Australia, EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/espionage
-fraud-good-faith-in-treaty-negotiations-east-timor-v-australia-in-the-permanent-court-of
-arbitration [http://perma.cc/2XS5-X2HD].
u. E.g., Leon Chung & Alexandra Payne, ICJ Orders Provisional Measures in Proceedings Between
East Timor and Australia, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Mar. 17, 2014), http://
www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/insights/legal-briefings/icj-orders-provisional-measures-in
-proceedings-between-east-timor-and-australia [http://perma.cc/J4PD-KYRH]; Sebastian
Perry, ICJ Orders Australia To Cease Spying on East Timor, GLOBAL ARB. REv. (Mar.
4, 2014), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/3247o [http://permacc/2472
-7QDC]; Stephen Tully, Legal Professional Privilege and National Security, NEw S. WALES BAR
Ass'N 24 (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.nswbar.asn.au/docs/webdocs/BN_0220i 4 RD.pdf
[http://perma.cc/N434-4D3M]. The ICJ in indicating provisional measures ultimately relied
on the privileged nature of the documents. Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention
of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Austl.), Provisional Measures, 2014 I.C.J.
147, ¶ 28 (Mar. 3) [hereinafter Timor-Leste v. Austl., Provisional Measures].
13. Timor-Leste v. Austl., Order, 3 (June 11, 2015), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/156
/18694.pdf [http://perma.cc/56AD-ED5S]. A seemingly large part of the reason why Timor-
Leste decided to withdraw the case is that Australia agreed to return the seized documents to
Timor-Leste. See Daniel Hurst, Timor-Leste Presses Ahead with Challenge to Timor Sea Oil and
Gas Treaty, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2os/jun/o5
/timor-leste-to-resume-treaty-challenge-after-australia-returned-documents [http://perma
.cc/L4PK-7KBW]. Nevertheless, it is not clear why Timor-Leste chose to withdraw the
entire case, as it had also requested declaratory relief concerning Australia's allegedly
unlawful actions. Memorial of Timor-Leste, supra note 1, at 62.
14. Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928); JAMES R.
CRAwFoRD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PuBLIc INTERNATIONAL LAw 245 (8th ed. 2012); SIR
ROBERT JENNINGS & SIR ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 563 (9th ed.
1992).
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is the set of tangible and intangible objects over which the state exercises
ownership,15 such as embassies, buildings, vehicles, and documents.
For the purposes of this Comment, a right is "general" if any interference
with it gives rise to a cause of action, whereas a right is "incomplete" if only
certain interferences with it give rise to a cause of action. As explained below,
the current state of international law is such that the state has a general right to
territory, 6 but an incomplete right to property. 7
A. The State's General Right to Territory
The state has a general right to territory because any interference with a
state's territory gives rise to a cause of action under international law, either
under the principle of state sovereignty or under the prohibition on territorial
conquest.
Although taken for granted today, the principle of state sovereignty was not
always a norm of international law. As late as the seventeenth century,
sovereigns coexisted without well-defined boundaries.' As a result, they
engaged in frequent warfare, culminating in the Peace of Westphalia of 1648,"
which established, inter alia, the principle of state sovereignty: states were
prohibited from interfering with another state's territory.'
Although this prohibition was a significant accomplishment, there was one
important exception: states could still lawfully acquire territory from other
states through military conquest.' Consequently, for centuries following the
Peace of Westphalia, states continued to engage in warfare to expand their
territory. ' It was only after the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 192823 and the U.N.
1s. See MARGARET MOORE, A POITICAL THEORY OF TERRITORY 15-16 (2015).
16. See infra Section I.A.
17. See infra Section I.B.
18. See Antonio Cassese, States: Rise and Decline of the Primary Subjects of the International
Community, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 49, 49-51
(Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters eds., 2012).
ig. See id. at So.
20. See id. at 50-51.
21. See Marcelo G. Kohen, Conquest, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L.
1 9 (Feb. 2oiS), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/io.o93/aw:epil/978o19923169o/law-97801
99231690-e27S [http://perma.cc/GP43-DWQJ; Hans-Ulrich Scupin, History of International
Law, 1815 to World War I, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. ¶ 36 (May
2011), http://opil.ouplaw.coVview/lo.io93/law:epil/978o19923169o/law-978019923169o
-e708 [http://perma.cc/8Q3F-UC2D].
22. For example, in the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, the major
European powers colonized and annexed many African territories in what has come to be
18o8
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Charter of 19454 that the prohibition on territorial conquest became a
respected norm of international law." From then on, any interference with a
state's territory constituted a prima facie breach of international law,
establishing the state's general right to territory in the international legal
order. 6
B. The State's Incomplete Right to Property
Unlike the state's right to territory, the state's right to property is
incomplete. Although the Immunities Convention of 2004' -which has not
yet entered into forces - appears to codify a general right to property, the
Convention would apply only to "the immunity of a State and its propertyfrom
the jurisdiction of the courts of another State."' Indeed, its purpose from the very
beginning was only to codify the rules of foreign sovereign immunity
applicable in national courts; it was never intended to prohibit interference
with state property in the international legal order.3 o
known as the "Scramble for Africa." See Matthew Craven, Colonialism and Domination, in
THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 18, at 862,
879-82.
23. General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928,
46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
24. U.N. Charter art. 2, 1 4.
25. Kohen, supra note 21, 5 12.
26. Indeed, future developments in the state's rights to territory all derived from the principle of
state sovereignty or the prohibition on territorial conquest. For example, although the
tribunal in the seminal Trail Smelter arbitration pioneered the prohibition on transboundary
environmental damage, it established the principle as a direct consequence of the principle
of state sovereignty. See Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1941).
27. United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, Dec.
2, 2004, U.N. Doc. A/59/5o8 [hereinafter Immunities Convention].
28. United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Jan. 4, 2016, 5:03 PM), http://treaties.un.org/Pages
/ViewDetails.aspxsrc=TREATY&mtdsg-no=III-13&chapter=3&lang=en [http://perma.cc
/HU26-TK8L] [hereinafter Immunities Convention Status]. The Convention will enter into
force after thirty states have become parties to the Convention. Immunities Convention,
supra note 27, art. 30. Currently, only twenty-one states are parties. Immunities Convention
Status, supra.
29. Immunities Convention, supra note 27, art. 1 (emphasis added).
3o. Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/46/10, at 13
(1991), reprinted in [1991] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 13, 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991
/Add.i (Part 2).
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The absence of a general right to property is understandable as a historical
matter. Traditionally, states kept all their property within their own territory,
such that the general prohibition on interfering with another state's territory
provided sufficient protection for states' property. But over time, states have
needed to locate more and more of their property extraterritorially. In
response, international law has evolved to provide protection -often in the
form of immunities-for this property. This protection, however, has
developed in a piecemeal fashion, creating rights to specific types of property
instead of establishing a general right to property.
The first type of protected extraterritorial property is diplomatic property.
Originating from the practice of Italian sovereign city-states, diplomatic
premises began enjoying immunity in the sixteenth century." Today, their
immunity has been enshrined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations of 1961 (VCDR), which extends immunities to other diplomatic
property as well, such as the diplomatic mission's means of transport, archives,
documents, correspondence, and diplomatic bag." The Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations of 1963 (VCCR) extends similar protections to consular
premises and property," as does the Convention on Special Missions of 1969
for the premises and property of special missions.' In the landmark Tehran
Hostages case of 1980, the ICJ held the relevant provisions of the VCDR and
VCCR to be general international law.3s
The second type of protected extraterritorial property is extraterritorial
vehicles, including ships, aircraft, and spacecraft. State ships employed for
noncommercial purposes have historically enjoyed immunity based on the legal
fiction that they form part of their flag state's territory;16 their immunity is
31. Arthur Eyffinger, Diplomacy, in THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 18, at 813, 820-22.
32. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations arts. 22-28, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500
U.N.T.S. 95.
33. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations arts. 31-36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261.
34. Convention on Special Missions arts. 24-28, Dec. 8, 1969, 1400 U.N.T.S. 231.
3s. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 31
(May 24). On the other hand, it is not clear if the Convention on Special Missions
reflects general international law. Nadia Kalb, Immunities, Special Missions, MAx PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L. ¶ 4 (May 2011), http://opil.ouplaw.comr/view/1o.1o93
/law:epiV978ol992369oAaw-9780199231690-e054 [http://perma.cc/L5HQ-5CJY].
36. Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias, State Ships, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB.
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now enshrined in the Unification Convention of 1926,37 the High Seas
Convention of 1958,18 and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982
(UNCLOS)." Under UNCLOS, state aircraft likewise enjoy the freedom of
overflight in the high seas and the exclusive economic zone,4 o and under the
Paris Convention of 1919, military aircraft enjoy certain immunities in the
territory of other states." State spacecraft are also accorded a certain degree of
immunity under the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.'
Therefore, as a matter of lex lata," any interference with a state's diplomatic
property or extraterritorial vehicles gives rise to a cause of action under
international law. But where a state interferes with any other type of property
belonging to another state, often no such cause of action arises. Indeed,
the very existence of treaties specifically protecting diplomatic property
and extraterritorial vehicles supports the contention that a general right to
property does not exist. After all, if there had been a general right to property,
then states would not have had to provide for specific protections in the
aforementioned treaties in the first place.
II. THE NEED FOR A GENERAL RIGHT TO PROPERTY
If the only types of state property at risk of interference were diplomatic
property and extraterritorial vehicles, then there would be no need for a general
right to property. However, each year more and more types of state property-
both within and outside of state territory-find themselves at risk.
Consider three examples. The first is computer networks: states are
increasingly launching cyberattacks on other states' computer networks, as
37. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Immunity of
State-Owned Vessels art. 3(), Apr. 10, 1926, 179 L.N.T.S. 199.
38. Convention on the High Seas art. 9, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
39. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 95-96, Dec. lo, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397.
40. Id. arts. 58(1), 87 (i)(b).
41. Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation (Paris Convention) art. 32, Oct.
13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173.
42. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. VIII, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
241o, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
43. Lex lata refers to "what the law is," as opposed to lexferenda, which refers to "what the law
should be."
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seen in Estonia,' Georgia,4 s Iran,46 Israel,' and the United States.8 Second,
communication systems: states are increasingly conducting espionage by
bugging other states' communication systems, as evidenced by Brazil,4 9
Germany,so Timor-Leste v. Australia,s' and most recently Croatia v. Slovenia.s2
Third, privileged documents: documents concerning pending litigations and
arbitrations have increasingly been targeted, as was the case in Kazakhstan,s'
Philippines v. China,' and Timor-Leste v. Australia.ss The list of types of state
property at risk goes on.
There are two ways to solve this problem. First, there is the piecemeal
approach, whereby the state's right to property develops incrementally by type
44. Steven Lee Myers, Cyberattack on Estonia Stirs Fear of "Virtual War," N.Y. TIMEs (May
18, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2oo7/o5/18/world/europe/18iht-estonia-4.5774234.html
[http://perma.cc/W7LZ-2FA6].
45. John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 12, 20o8), http://www
.nytimes.com/2008/o8/13/technology/l3cyber.html [http://perma.cc/6XYD-5A6D].
46. Thomas Erdbrink & Ellen Nakashima, Iran Struggling To Contain "Foreign-Made" "Stuxnet"
Computer Virus, WASH. PosT (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn
/content/article/2olo/o9/27/AR2ooo927o6229.html [http://perma.cc/9TLC-QSG2].
47. Isabel Kershner, Israel Says It Repelled Most Attacks on Its Web Sites by Pro-Palestinian Hackers,
N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2oi3/o4/o8/world/middleeast/pro
-palestinian-hackers-attack-israeli-sites.html [http://perma.cc/JZT7-EHAJ].
48. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking of Government Computers Exposed 21.5 Million People,
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2oi5/o7/lo/us/office-of-personnel
-management-hackers-got-data-of-millions.html [http://perma.cc/26BV-N3NQJ.
49. Julian Borger, Brazilian President: US Surveillance a "Breach ofInternational Law," GUARDIAN
(Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.theguardian.conVworld/2oi3/sep/24/brazil-president-un
-speech-nsa-surveillance [http://perma.cc/PVRS-J24K].
So. Alison Smale, Anger GrowingAmongAllies on U.S. Spying, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/1o/24/world/europe/united-states-disputes-reports-of-wiretapping
-in-Europe.html [http://perma.cc/6LB7-HS9P].
si. Memorial of Timor-Leste, supra note 1, 3.4.
s2. Alison Ross, ICJ President Backs out of Croatia-Slovenia Dispute, GLOBAL ARB. REv.
(Aug. 5, 2015), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/34038/icj-president-backs
-croatia-slovenia-dispute [http://perma.cc/M3K7-TFVE]; Arman Sarvarian & Rudy Baker,
Arbitration Between Croatia and Slovenia: Leaks, Wiretaps, Scandal, EJIL: TALK! (July
28, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/arbitration-between-croatia-and-slovenia-leaks-wiretaps
-scandal [http://perma.cc/9SLY-JMQV].
ss. Douglas Thomson, Curtis-Kazakhstan E-mails Hacked by Unknowns, GLOBAL ARB. REv.
(Mar. 18, 2015), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/336So/curtis-kazakhstan
-e-mails-hacked-unknowns [http://perma.cc/LTW9-XBA9].
54. Alison Ross, Cybersecurity and Confidentiality Shocks for the PCA, GLOB. ARB. REv. (July 23,
2015), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/34ooo/cybersecurity-confidentiality
-shocks-pca [http://perma.cc/889U-TMAV].
ss. Timor-Leste v. Austl., Provisional Measures, supra note 12, ¶ 33.
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of property. This has been the prevailing approach for decades, and as a result,
today the state has an incomplete right to property (i.e., rights to only certain
types of its property).s The second approach is the holistic approach, whereby
the state's right to property develops as a general matter, such that the default
is that all of a state's property is protected under international law. Under this
approach, states would have a general right to property (i.e., rights to all types
of its property).
Today, the piecemeal approach continues to prevail. To protect state
computer networks, commentators have proposed' and states have
concludeds8 cybersecurity treaties. To protect state communication systems,
some commentators have similarly pushed for an anti-espionage treaty.59 And
to protect privileged state documents, the ICJ declared in its provisional-
measures order in Timor-Leste v. Australia that states plausibly have the right to
exclude other states from accessing their privileged documents.o
The piecemeal approach undeniably has its benefits: in particular, it allows
states to develop regimes of protection customized to each type of property.
Nevertheless, there are three reasons why the holistic approach is necessary to
supplement the piecemeal approach.
56. See supra Section I.B.
57. E.g., Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 880-84
(2012); David Weissbrodt, Cyber-Conflict, Cyber-Crime, and Cyber-Espionage, 22 MINN. J.
INT'L L. 347, 385-87 (2013); Stephen Moore, Note, Cyber Attacks and the Beginnings of an
International Cyber Treaty, 39 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 223 (2013).
58. China and the United States concluded a "cyber agreement" in September 2015. JOHN
W. ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN10376, U.S.-CHINA CYBER AGREEMENT
1 (2015). In addition, forty-seven states have ratified or acceded to the Council of
Europe Convention on Cybercrime. Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 185,
Convention on Cybercrime, COUNCIL OF EUR. (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.coe.int/en
/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185/signatures?p-auth=igXbHmds [http://
perma.cc/LS79-K3MH].
s9. E.g., John O'Donnell & Luke Baker, Germany, France Demand "No-Spy" Agreement with
U.S., REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2ol3/io/25/us-eu-summit
-idUSBRE99NoBJ2o131o2s [http://perma.cc/7U35-PQ59)]; Boris Pankin, Opinion, An
Espionage Treaty, Moscow TIMES (Apr. 12, 2001), http://www.themoscowtimes.com
/opinion/article/an-espionage-treaty/254065.html [http://perma.cc/RW8W-8L8A]; Michael
Reisman, Opinion, Accord on Embassy Espionage Would Ease U.S.-Soviet Tensions, NEW
HAVEN REGISTER, Sept. 11, 1988, at B3; William Safire, Opinion, Stop the Espionage Race,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/20/opinion/essay-stop-the
-espionage-race.html [http://perma.cc/V3BY-T6GD].
6o. Timor-Leste v. Austl., Provisional Measures, supra note 12, ¶f 27-28. The ICJ only held that
the right is "plausible," because "plausibility" is the standard for a provisional-measures
order. See id. I¶ 26, 28.
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First, the piecemeal approach is reactive, whereas the holistic approach is
proactive. Under the piecemeal approach, the state's right to a certain type of
property almost always develops only after interferences with that type of
property begin to occur, often due to an innovation in technology. The
subsequent process of development takes time: for example, a comprehensive
cybersecurity treaty and an anti-espionage treaty have been in the works for
decades, allowing states to interfere with state computer networks and
communication systems with impunity in the interim.6 ' Under the holistic
approach, on the other hand, states would have a default right to all of their
property, even against unprecedented interferences with a specific type of
property.
Second, the piecemeal approach places the burden of proof on the victim
state, whereas the holistic approach places the burden on the perpetrator state.
Under the piecemeal approach, even when one state unquestionably interferes
with another state's property, the victim state must prove that it had a right to
that property under international law. For example, in Timor-Leste v. Australia,
Timor-Leste carried the burden of proving that it had a right to the
confidentiality of its privileged documents, causing years of litigation over
what should have been a simple issue. Under the holistic approach, the
presumption would be reversed, such that the victim state could always invoke
its general right to property and the perpetrator state would have the burden of
raising an affirmative defense.
Third, the piecemeal approach makes it difficult to articulate a right to
previously unrecognized types of property in the court of public opinion,
whereas the holistic approach would facilitate such articulation. Under the
piecemeal approach, this "articulation difficulty" could lead to impunity for the
perpetrator. For example, after the National Security Agency (NSA) tapped
Chancellor Angela Merkel's and President Rousseff s phone conversations, the
German and Brazilian governments had trouble pointing to a specific rule of
international law that the United States had violated.* Ultimately, many
commentators conceded that the NSA's activities did not violate international
61. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
62. The court did not expressly state that Timor-Leste had the burden of proof, but the
court effectively required an affirmative finding that Timor-Leste's claimed rights plausibly
existed. See Timor-Leste v. Austi., Provisional Measures, supra note 12, ¶ 26.
63. President Rousseff nonetheless accused the United States of violating international law,
arguing in front of the U.N. General Assembly that "[t]ampering in such a manner in the
affairs of other countries is a breach of international law and is an affront of the principles
that must guide the relations among them." Borger, supra note 49.
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law at all.6" More dangerously, this "articulation difficulty" may also lead to the
distortion of other rules of international law. For example, in light of recent
Chinese cyberattacks against American entities,s U.S. lawyers and academics
have been scrambling to find the legal grounds for declaring such action
unlawful under international law. Compelled by a sense that significant
cyberattacks must somehow violate international law, commentators have
developed theories about when a cyberattack amounts to a breach of the
prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, 6
arguably leading to overly expansive interpretations of Article 2(4).6' The
holistic approach, however, would make clear that the fundamental reason why
these acts are wrongful is that they are interferences with another state's
property; there should be no need to invoke the laws on the use of force to
declare a cyberattack unlawful. Unfortunately, however, the absence of the
general right to property under current international law deprives states and
64. See, e.g., Richard Norton-Taylor, Merkel Phone Tapping Fair Game Under International Law,
Says Ex-M16 Deputy, GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world
/2o14/feb/18/merkel-phone-tapping-law-mi6-nigel-inkster [http://perma.cc/M7ET-H2EX]
(quoting a former deputy chief of M16 as saying that the surveillance "would appear to be
fair game"); Stefan Talmon, Tapping the German Chancellor's Cell Phone and Public
International Law, CAMBRIDGE J. INT'L & COMp. L. (Nov. 6, 2013), http://cjicl.org.uk/2o13
/ii/o6/tapping-german-chancellors-cell-phone-public-international-law [http://perma.cc
/VVL2-DPTS] ("The tapping of the Chancellor constitutes espionage in times of peace and,
as such, does not generally violate public international law.").
65. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Confidential Report Lists U.S. Weapons System Designs
Compromised by Chinese Cyberspies, WASH. PosT (May 27, 2013), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/confidential-report-lists-us-weapons-system
-designs-compromised-by-chinese-cyberspies/203/o/27/a42c3elc-c2dd-n1e2-8c3b-ob 5e 924
7e8ca story.html [http://perma.cc/DSSW-TVTF]; Annual Report to Congress: Military and
Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2015, OFF. SECRETARY DEF.
38-39 (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/i/Documents/pubs/2o5_China
Military-PowerReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/6KAG-FANU].
66. E.g., INT'L GRP. OF EXPERTS, NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, TALLINN
MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAw APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 48-51 (Michael N.
Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL]; Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the
Laws of War, 30 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 525, 535-41 (2012); Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber
Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum Revisited, 56 VILL. L. REV. 569, 573-78 (2011); Matthew C.
Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use ofForce: Back to the Future ofArticle 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT'L
L. 421,431-40 (2011).
67. For example, the authoritative Tallinn Manual lists a set of factors that go well beyond the
traditional notions of what constitutes a violation of Article 2(4). Compare TALLINN
MANUAL, supra note 66, at 48-51, with Oliver Dbrr &Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in i
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 200, 208-13 (3d ed. 2012).
Similarly, Michael Schmitt argues that, because of cyberattacks, violations of Article 2(4)
may be nonmilitary; this argument directly contradicts the traditional understanding of
Article 2(4). Compare Schmitt, supra note 66, at 573, with Darr & Randelzhofer, supra, at 210.
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commentators of the necessary language to articulate this rationale. For this
reason, along with the two previously mentioned, this Comment proposes that
the international community take a holistic approach to the problem by
working toward a general right to property.
Skeptks may be concerned that a general right to property goes too far. As
Australia argued during the hearings on provisional measures, a general right
to property "would allow a State adventitiously to expand its sovereignty into
the territory of other States."69 Nevertheless, history reveals that states are
willing to sacrifice aspects of their sovereignty for the equal protection of
property rights. After all, states came together to protect diplomatic property
and extraterritorial vehicles,70 and states have also come together to protect
computer networks." The one exception may be espionage: state support for
an anti-espionage treaty is relatively weak, and commentators have argued that
bugging the communication systems of other states is not necessarily a
violation of international law.' Nevertheless, the general right to property
would merely be a default: if espionage is lawful under international law, it
would remain lawful. The major difference under a general-right regime would
be that the state conducting the espionage would bear the burden of showing
its legality.
III. TOWARD A GENERAL RIGHT TO PROPERTY
The piecemeal and holistic approaches are not mutually exclusive; they
should work in tandem. As discussed earlier, commentators and states have
already dedicated considerable thought, time, and energy to developing
piecemeal solutions to today's most pressing problems.' Indeed, efforts to
conclude cybersecurity and anti-espionage treaties are commendable.
Nevertheless, the predominant concerns of today will be different from those
68. Although there has been little movement for a general right to property for states in the
international legal order, there has been a movement for a general right to property for
individuals in domestic legal orders. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
6g. Timor-Leste v. Austl., Jan. 21. Verbatim Record, supra note 5, at 12.
70. See supra Section I.B.
p1. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
72. Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 321,
347 (1996); see supra note 64 and accompanying text. But see Manuel R. Garcia-Mora,
Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses Under the Law ofExtradition, 26 U. Prr. L.
REV. 65, 79-80 (1964); Quincy Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in
Internal Affairs, in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 12 (Roland J. Stanger
ed., 1962).
73. See supra Section I.B, Part II.
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of tomorrow. In the long term, we need a more sustainable solution: a general
right to property.
This general right could emerge in one of three ways: by treaty, by custom,
or by general principle of law.' A Convention on the State's Right to Property
sounds appealing, but the political obstacles would likely be insurmountable.
States are already having trouble concluding treaties to effectively protect
computer networks and communication systems; concluding a treaty to protect
all types of property, a fortiori, would be even more difficult. Similarly, the
development of a customary general right to property is appealing," but it
would be difficult to prove the existence of the requisite state practice and
opiniojuris. 6
The most feasible option, then, is the development of a general principle.
Unlike treaties and custom, which derive from the acts of states in the
international legal order, general principles develop from analogies with the
law of domestic legal orders.' Avery strong case may be made that the general
74. Treaties, custom, and general principles are the three main sources of international law.
Alain Pellet, Article 38, in 3 THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A
COMMENTARY 731, 797-98 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012). They are
authoritatively set forth in the ICJ Statute. Statute of the International Court of Justice art.
38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
75. Timor-Leste attempted to argue for a customary general right to property during the oral
proceedings. Timor-Leste v. Austl., Jan. 22, 1o:oo AM. Verbatim Record, supra note io, at
19 ("[W]e read this practice, and these authoritative writings, as recognizing a general
customary rule of inviolability and immunity of State property.").
76. State practice and opinio juris are the two elements of customary international law. North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den., Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶
77 (Feb. 20); Pellet, supra note 74, at 814. As defined by the ICJ, opiniojuris is the "belief that
[the State practice] is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it."
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 77. Note that Sprankling, when
arguing for a general right to property for individuals, asserts that the two elements are
present. Sprankling, The Global Right to Property, supra note 7, at 493-97. However, it is
much more difficult to establish the two elements with respect to the property of states, as
there are far fewer cases where states directly interfere with the property of other states.
77. See ICJ Statute, supra note 74, art. 38(1)(c) (stating "general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations" (emphasis added)); Pellet, supra note 74, at 834; Advisory Comm.
Jurists, Procis-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, June 16th-July 24 th 1920
with Annexes, PERMANENT CT. INT'L JUST. 335 (1920), http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serieD
/D-proceedings of committeeannexesi 6june_24july 192O.pdf [http://perma.cc/P9WD
-5HBD] [hereinafter Procis-Verbaux] ("[T]he general principles referred to in point 3 were
these which were accepted by all nations in foro domestico, such as certain principles of
procedure, the principle of good faith, and the principle of res judicata, etc."); Giorgio
Gaja, General Principles of Law, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L. ¶¶ 8-1o (May
2013), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1o93/law:epil/978019923t690/law-978o199231690
-e1410 ?rskey=9f5vgy&result=3&prd=OPIL [http://perma.cc/J38N-N7SV]. For example,
Judge Simma in his separate opinion in Oil Plaorms, after having examined Canadian,
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right to property similarly constitutes a general principle of law: ninety-five
percent of the 193 Member States of the United Nations guarantee a general
right to property in their domestic law.8 Although this right only applies to
individuals in domestic legal orders, the right may be transposed to the
international legal order as a general principle of law to apply to states as well.
Applying this right to states is, moreover, supported by the principle of the
sovereign equality of states enshrined in Article 2(1) of the U.N. Charter.'
Furthermore, it should be remembered that the Advisory Committee of
Juristsso included general principles of law as a source of international law for
the very purpose of avoiding situations of non liquet, where there is no law to
apply because the issue at hand is sufficiently novel or unprecedented.8 ' It
therefore seems particularly appropriate to invoke general principles to
establish rights over previously unrecognized types of property.
French, German, and Swiss law, concluded that "the principle of joint-and-several
responsibility . . . can properly be regarded as a 'general principle of law.'" Oil Platforms
(Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 358 ¶ 74 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion by Simma, J.).
78. Sprankling, The Global Right to Property, supra note 7, at 484.
79. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1; cf Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment,
2012 I.C.J. 140, 5 57 (Feb. 3) (holding that state immunity derives from the principle of
sovereign equality under Article 2(1) of the U.N. Charter).
so. The League of Nations, the predecessor to the United Nations, appointed the Advisory
Committee of Jurists in 1920 to "prepar[e] plans for the establishment of the Permanent
Court of International Justice." Procks-Verbaux, supra note 77, at iii. The Advisory
Committee drafted Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
Pellet, supra note 74, at 742-43, which eventually became Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, id.
at 743-45, the authoritative list of the sources of international law, see supra note 74.
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CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, this Comment argues that international
courts and tribunals should take the initiative of recognizing the state's general
right to property as a general principle of law. The ICJ had the opportunity to
do so in Timor-Leste v. Australia, but it instead ordered provisional measures on
the far narrower ground of legal privilege." But because questions surrounding
the state's right to property are bound to arise in many more cases to come, the
next international court or tribunal should not miss the opportunity to assert
the state's general right to property as a general principle of law.
PETER TZENG
82. Timor-Leste v. Austl., Provisional Measures, supra note 12, ¶ 28.
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